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NEW YORK v. QUARLES: THE "PUBLIC SAFETY" EXCEPTION
TO MIRANDA
I. INTRODUCTION
In New York v. Quarles," the Supreme Court attempted to limit the
exclusionary sanction provided under Miranda v. Arizona.2 Quarles is a
significant decision in the criminal procedure area not only because of the
exception which it establishes, but because it represents "a legitimate ef-
fort by the Burger Court to reconcile the realities of effective law enforce-
ment with the often hypertechnical rules of criminal justice."3 Many ob-
servers have interpreted the Quarles decision as the long-awaited fruition
of the conservatism now presiding over the Burger Court.4 However, the
setting for Quarles can be traced back to the Miranda decision itself.
A. Miranda v. Arizona: The Precedent
1. Requisite Procedural Safeguards Announced
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that in the context of a
"custodial interrogation,"5 certain procedural safeguards6 are necessary to
protect the criminal suspect's fifth amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. 7 More specifically, the Court held that "the
1. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) (5-1-3 decision).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Rogers, Criminal Law Decisions of the 1983-84 Term: The Court Reaches Out to
Adopt a "Common Sense" Approach, 14 Sup. CT. RESEARCHER 115, 122 (1984); see, e.g.,
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (adopting a "good faith" exception to the
fourth amendments exclusionary rule).
4. Rogers, supra note 3, at 125 (A coalition formed by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and White have prevailed in most of the decisions in the 1984
Term which appears to have split the Court along ideological lines).
5. The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. Though Miranda on its facts
applied to station house questioning, it has not been so limited in subsequent decisions. See,
e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (police car); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324
(1969) (suspect's bedroom); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (suspect's prison
cell).
6. The Miranda Court suggested that the suspect, prior to questioning, be warned "that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at
479.
7. The fifth amendment provides: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964) (declaring the fifth amendment applicable to the states under the fourteenth
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prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demon-
strates the use of procedural safeguards.""
The Miranda Court was seeking both to deter police misconduct and to
protect the constitutional rights of an accused.9 The Court believed that
the subtle use of psychological coercion in custodial interrogations could
only be effectively eradicated through designated limitations on the inter-
rogation process itself.'0 However, the Court noted that the sanctions
chosen should not unnecessarily burden the traditional functions of effec-
tive law enforcement." Presumably, the Warren Court believed that the
limitations it suggested properly addressed these corresponding concerns.
2. The Reception of Miranda by the Burger Court
Miranda was perhaps the most controversial of the criminal procedure
decisions rendered by the Warren Court.12 While a detailed analysis of its
ramifications is beyond the scope of this comment, the Miranda doctrine
has generally fallen into disfavor with the conservative majority now pre-
siding over the Burger Court. 3 This development is reflected both in the
Court's substantive decisions 14 and in the manner in which it has exer-
cised its power of review.' 5 The Burger Court has consistently refused the
amendment due process clause).
8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 450-53; see also Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is
"Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 16-18 (1978); Comment, Rhode Is-
land v. Innis: A Workable Definition of "Interrogation", 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 385, 386
(1981).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-64.
11. Id. at 450-53. The Miranda Court noted that "the traditional function of police of-
ficers to investigate crimes , . . [and to conduct] [gleneral on-the-scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime" would still be permitted prior to the administering of the sug-
gested warnings. Id. at 477. Preserving life has also been characterized as a "common law
function" of the police. United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.) (recognizing the
emergency exception to the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964); see also
Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 249, 250
(1975).
12. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 106.
13. Id. at 100.
14. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that evidence derived from
statements elicited in violation of Miranda is admissible if the statements themselves have
not been used to prove the prosecution's case at trial); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (declaring that evidence obtained without compliance with Miranda safeguards is
admissible in criminal prosecutions for impeachment purposes).
15. Stone, supra note 12, at 100-01. Professor Stone notes that:
[During the 1973-1976 Terms,] the Court has granted certiorari in only one of the
thirty-five cases on its appellate docket in which a defendant sought review of a lower
court decision holding evidence admissible over a claimed violation of Miranda. Dur-
ing the same period, the Court has granted certiorari in thirteen of the twenty-five
[Vol. 19:193
PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
opportunity to raise Miranda's strictures to the status of constitutionally
mandated provisions.16 Moreover, the propriety of balancing the govern-
ment's interest in using the evidence against the competing interests
served by its exclusion had already received limited recognition in the
decisions immediately preceding Quarles.17 In retrospect, the stage was
clearly set for a Quarles-type opinion.
B. The Case of New York v. Quarles
1. The Facts
On September 11, 1980, shortly after midnight, a woman approached
two police officers who were on patrol and told them that she had just
been raped.1 8 She gave a detailed description of her assailant and told
them the man had just entered a nearby supermarket, and further, that
he was carrying a gun.
While one of the officers radioed for assistance, the other (Officer
Kraft) entered the store and spotted the respondent, who matched the
description given by the woman. The respondent then ran toward the
rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with his gun drawn. Of-
ficer Kraft lost sight of the respondent for several seconds, but upon
regaining sight of him, ordered him to stop and put his hands over his
head.19
Officer Kraft frisked the respondent and discovered that he was wear-
ing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After handcuffing the re-
spondent, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. The respondent
nodded toward some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over
there." Officer Kraft then retrieved the gun from one of the cartons, for-
mally arrested the respondent, and only then read him his Miranda
cases in which the government sought review of a lower court decision excluding evi-
dence on the authority of Miranda .... In ten of these cases, the Court interpreted
Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evidence. In the remaining cases, the
Court avoided a direct ruling on the Miranda issue, holding the evidence inadmissible
on other grounds. In effect, then, the Court has not held a single item of evidence
inadmissible on the authority of Miranda.
Id.
16. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (declaring Miranda's procedural
safeguards are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.").
17. Id. at 450 (weighing the judiciary's interest in obtaining relevant and trustworthy evi-
dence against society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals); see also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (calling for a balancing test in
determining whether evidence should be excluded because of violations of Miranda's
safeguards).
18. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2629-30 (1984).
19. Three other officers had arrived on the scene by the time the respondent had stopped
at Officer Kraft's demand. Id. at 2630.
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rights.'0 The respondent was charged in a New York state court with the
criminal possession of a weapon.2
2. The Lower Court Decisions
At trial, the judge excluded the statement, "the gun is over there," and
the gun itself,22 because the officer had not given the respondent the
warnings required by Miranda before asking him where the gun was lo-
cated. This decision was subsequently affirmed without opinion by the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.23
The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the lower court rulings.
The court rejected the state's argument that the exigencies of the situa-
tion justified Officer Kraft's failure to read the respondent his Miranda
rights until after he had located the gun.2 5 The court found it unnecessary
to address the plausibility of an emergency exception to the usual re-
quirements of Miranda, because it found no factual indication in the rec-
ord supporting the proposition that Officer Kraft's inquiry was motivated
by a subjective concern to secure either his own safety or the safety of the
public.26
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the
New York Court of Appeals to suppress the respondent's statement and
the gun.27 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, concurred in the
20. After administering the Miranda warnings, Officer Kraft then asked the respondent if
he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. The respondent answered that he did own
it and that he had purchased it in Miami, Florida. Id.
21. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The state originally charged the re-
spondent with rape, but the count was dropped at the trial level.
22. The gun and statements about the respondent's ownership and place of purchase were
excluded as the "tainted fruit" of the improper custodial interrogation. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
at 2630. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
23. 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981).
24. 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982) (4-3 decision).
25. 58 N.Y.2d 664, 666-67, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985-86, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521-22 (1982).
26. Id. (concluding "there is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent
circumstances posing a risk to the public safety.").
27. Once the Court concluded that Officer Kraft's question concerning the whereabouts of
the gun was legally permissible, the gun and the statements about the respondent's owner-
ship and place of purchase were no longer subject to a tainted evidence characterization.
Accordingly, they were also deemed admissible. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2634
(1984).
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, asserted that the gun was
admissible as nontestimonial evidence which is not proscribed by the Miranda decision or
the fifth amendment. Id. at 2636-41. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(blood tests held admissible because they were neither testimonial nor communicative in
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lower courts' belief that the applicable limitations of Miranda had not
been followed.2 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the admissibility of the
evidence through the introduction of a new "public safety" exception to
the exclusionary sanction inherent in Miranda.29
The Court acknowledged the fact that Officer Kraft needed an answer
to his inquiry not only to make his case against the respondent, but also
to insure that further danger to the public did not result from conceal-
ment of the gun in a public area.30 The Court cautioned that if the recital
of Miranda warnings was required before such an inquiry, suspects in the
respondent's position might well be deterred from responding.3 1 In light
of the potential cost to society imposed by this dilemma,3 2 the Court con-
cluded "that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the [fjifth [a]mendment's privilege against self-incrimination"
provided under Miranda.33
The Quarles Court recognized that in resolving the aforementioned di-
lemma, it lessened the desirable clarity of Miranda's strictures.3 4 The sig-
nificance, justification, and applicability of the Quarles decision will now
be reviewed to evaluate the validity of such candor.
II. THE ANALYSIS OF New York v. Quarles
A. Significance of the Use of an "Exception"
The Quarles Court noted, with apparent ease, that the facts before it
came "within the ambit of the Miranda decision."" Accordingly, it con-
cluded that the only way to admit the evidence that was elicited in viola-
tion of Miranda was to fashion an exception. 6 The "public safety" excep-
tion or its functional equivalent had been a topic of judicial debate long
before the Quarles decision was rendered. A brief review of the analytical
nature). In developing the "public safety" exception, Justice Rehnquist found no occasion to
address the argument that the gun was admissible either because it is nontestimonial or
because the police would inevitably have discovered it absent their questioning. Quarles,
104 S. Ct. at 2634 n.9. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, had serious doubts regard-
ing Justice O'Connor's proposal for admissibility, but refused to discuss them because the
"novel" theory was not raised in the New York courts. Id. at 2649 n.11.
28. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 (holding that the lower courts were "undoubtedly correct
in deciding that the facts of this case [came] within the ambit of the Miranda decision.").
29. Id. at 2632.
30. Id. at 2632-33 (noting the possible existence of an accomplice or the danger to a cus-
tomer or employee who might happen upon the gun).
31. Id. at 2632.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
33. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
34. Id. at 2631.
35. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631 (1984).
36. Id. at 2632.
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struggle experienced in such precedent insures that proper significance
will be accorded to Quarles' analytical conclusions.
Before the Quarles decision, courts confronted with similar factual sce-
narios- used two distinctive analytical approaches to sustain the admissi-
bility of the evidence in question. Under the first approach a number of
courts concluded that the facts before them came within the ambit of the
Miranda decision, and requisite exceptions were then developed." How-
ever, an equal number of courts concluded that the facts before them did
not come within the ambit of the Miranda decision, reasoning that the
questions of the police did not constitute "interrogation" under Mi-
randa.38 These courts emphasized that it is simply not custody plus
37. See, e.g., United States v. Mesa, 487 F. Supp. 562 (D.N.J.) (pre-Miranda inquiries
concerning weapons illegal under Miranda), rev'd, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980); Cronk v.
State, - Ind. App. -, 443 N.E.2d 882 (1983) (pre-Miranda inquiries concerning location
and method of detonation of a bomb condoned under an "emergency exception" to Mi-
randa); People v. Toler, 45 Mich. App. 156, 206 N.W.2d 253 (1973) (pre-Miranda inquiries
concerning location of suspect's gun condoned under a "limited exception" to Miranda);
People v. Ramos, 17 Mich. App. 515, 170 N.W.2d 189 (1969) (pre-Miranda inquiries con-
cerning location of suspect's gun condoned as a necessary protective procedure); State v.
Lackey, 3 Ohio App. 3d 239, 444 N.E.2d 1047 (1981) (pre-Miranda inquiries concerning
location of suspect's gun condoned under an "exception" to Miranda); State v. Markovich,
17 Wash. App. 809, 565 P.2d 440 (1977) (pre-Miranda inquiries concerning whether suspect
had a gun condoned under an "exception" to Miranda). The California courts had devel-
oped a similar exception known as the "rescue doctrine" applicable in kidnapping interroga-
tions. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124 (pre-
Miranda decision), cert. denied sub nom. Modesto v. Nelson, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); People
v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Riddle v.
California, 440 U.S. 937 (1979); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555
(1974); Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 595 (1981).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 611 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1979) (inquiries concerning
whether suspect had a gun do not constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda);
United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) (inquiries concerning whether sus-
pect had any weapons within reach do not constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Mi-
randa); Davis v. State, 389 So. 2d 950 (Ala. App.) (inquiries concerning whether suspect had
a gun did not constitute interrogation proscribed by Miranda), rev'd sub nom. Ex parte
Davis, 389 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1980); Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970) (inquiries con-
cerning whether suspect had a gun do not constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Mi-
randa); State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360, 674 P.2d 1358 (1983) (inquiries concerning location of
suspect's gun may not constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda); State v. Heath,
122 Ariz. 36, 592 P.2d 1302 (1979) (inquiries concerning what had happened and location of
suspect's gun do not constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda); People v. West, 107
Cal. App. 3d 987, 165 Cal, Rptr. 24 (1980) (inquiries concerning whether suspect had any
accomplices do not constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda); People v. Mullins,
188 Colo. 23, 532 P.2d 733 (1975) (inquiries concerning location of suspect's gun do not
constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda); Aldridge v. State, 247 Ga. 142, 274
S.E.2d 525 (1981) (inquiry concerning what had happened was attempt to ascertain the na-
ture of the immediate situation and therefore did not constitute questioning proscribed by
Miranda); People v. Brown, 131 Ill. App. 2d 244, 266 N.E.2d 131 (1970) (inquiries concern-
ing location of suspect's gun do not violate the fifth amendment); Hunt v. State, 2 Md. App.
443, 234 A.2d 785 (1967) (noting inquiries by prison officials relating to the maintenance of
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"questioning," as such, which calls for Miranda safeguards, but rather,
custody plus police conduct calculated to elicit incriminating evidence.
The courts reasoned that where the primary motive prompting the of-
ficer's questioning was not to elicit incriminating evidence, but to secure
public safety, no "interrogation" under Miranda had occurred.3 9 There-
fore, the exclusionary sanction inherent in Miranda was not applicable,
and the evidence in question was admissible.
In Quarles, the Court implicitly rejected this second approach. While
holding that Officer Kraft's question regarding the whereabouts of the
gun was prompted by a concern for public safety,40 the Court nevertheless
believed that the strictures of Miranda were applicable and had not been
followed.41 Thus, by recognizing the applicability of Miranda, the Court
was required to fashion an exception in order to admit the evidence
against the defendant.
B. The Role of the Balancing Test in Fifth Amendment Analysis
The "public safety" exception was derived from a tacit balancing of
interests initiated by the Supreme Court.4 2 In Quarles, the Court con-
cluded that the securing of public safety is paramount to the strictures of
Miranda.43 However, the mere use of a balancing process within a fifth
amendment analysis was strongly questioned by the dissent.44
The majority found ample justification for its use of a balancing test.
First, the Court noted that the prophylactic Miranda warnings provide
only "practical reinforcement" for the fifth amendment. 5 They are "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution.' 46 Second, the propriety
internal security and discipline do not fall within the ambit of Miranda); Commonwealth v.
Hankins, 293 Pa. Super. 341, 439 A.2d 142 (1981) (inquiries concerning location of suspect's
accomplices do not constitute "questioning" proscribed by Miranda); State v. Lane, 77
Wash. 2d 860, 467 P.2d 304 (1970) (inquiries concerning whether suspect had a gun do not
constitute "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda); State v. LaRue, 19 Wash. App. 841, 578
P.2d 66 (1978) (inquiries concerning location of prisoner's knife do not constitute "interro-
gation" proscribed under Miranda).
39. Castellana, 500 F.2d at 326; West, 107 Cal. App. 3d at -, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 28;
Aldridge, 274 Ga. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 529-30; Hankins, 293 Pa. Super. at -, 439 A.2d at
144.
40. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
41. Id. at 2631.
42. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. Many observers noted that in the cur-
rent use of a cost-benefit analysis, the Burger Court has pronounced that the "ends some-
times do justify the means." Rogers, supra note 3, at 122.
43. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2633 (1984).
44. Id. at 2641 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) ("The suggested safeguards were not
intended to create a constitutional straitjacket.") (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
457 (1966)).
46. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
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of the balancing process had already been recognized in the fashioning of
exceptions to the fourth amendment." Third, a balancing test had al-
ready been implicitly used in other Miranda-type cases.4" Finally, the
Quarles majority recognized a judicial balancing process implicit in Mi-
randa itself, weighing the benefits of "enlarged protection for the [f]ifth
[a]mendment" against "the cost to society in terms of fewer convictions
of guilty suspects. '49 Consequently, the majority found no problem with
adding the concern for public safety to this "pre-existing" scale.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the mere use
of a balancing test exemplifies a misreading of Miranda and the fifth
amendment. 50 He stated that the fifth amendment is absolute in its guar-
anty that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."'1 Justice Marshall noted further that the Mi-
randa Court itself considered social arguments akin to those raised before
the Quarles Court.52 Nevertheless, to the Miranda Court, the privilege
against self-incrimination was a right that "[could not] be abridged. '53
Accordingly, Justice Marshall concluded that such an absolute right is
not susceptible to the tacit balancing engaged in by the majority and
from which the "public safety" exception was derived.5 4
Arguably, it is Justice Marshall who has misread the focus and scope of
the majority's opinion in the Quarles decision. The balancing process en-
gaged in by the majority is directed to the applicability of the limitations
47. The need to protect the physical safety of the police officer was weighed against the
government's interest in investigating a crime in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (The
Terry Court allowed the police to detain a suspect and make a limited protective search for
weapons whenever the officer has a reasonable belief that the person is armed and presents
a danger to the officer or others nearby). It has been stated that the "public safety" excep-
tion is a "bona fide and minimally offensive security measure in the line of Terry v. Ohio."
United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
49. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. In Miranda, the cost to society was apparently out-
weighed by the added protection the procedural safeguards would provide. Id.
50. Id. at 2645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
52. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2645. In Miranda, Justice White, in dissent, warned that the
proposed rules would "operate indiscriminately in all criminal cases, regardless of the sever-
ity of the crime or the circumstances involved." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 544 (White, J.,
dissenting).
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Specifically, the Miranda court noted that:
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation out-
weighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court. . . .The whole
thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed
the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it
provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged.
Id. (citations omitted).
54. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2647.
[Vol. 19:193
PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
of Miranda, not the applicability of the fifth amendment.5 Miranda's
limitations serve only to reinforce the protections secured by the fifth
amendment.5 6 Since they are not part of the fifth amendment, how could
they be subject to any precedent barring its abridgment? Arguably, the
strictures of the fifth amendment are not directly affected by the Quarles
analysis or its conclusions.
The existing applicability of the fifth amendment itself is demonstrated
in the majority's concern that the respondent remain free on remand to
argue that his statement was actually coerced or compelled under tradi-
tional due process standards.51 The "public safety" exception seeks only
to reject the argument that the respondent's statement must be pre-
sumed compelled because of Officer Kraft's failure to administer Miranda
warnings.5
C. The Applicability of the "Public Safety" Exception: Employing An
Objective Standard
The Quarles Court stated that the availability of the "public safety"
exception should be based on an objective review of the circumstances
surrounding the custodial interrogation.59 The Court reasoned that:
In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where
spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the or-
der of the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today
should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing
concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.6 0
55. The Quarles Court prefaced its opinion by recognizing that the "only issue" before
them was whether Officer Kraft was justified in failing to administer the Miranda warnings.
Id. at 2631. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974) (noting that although
the police misconduct departed from the prophylactic standard set out in Miranda, it had
not abridged the respondents constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination).
56. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
57. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5. Before Miranda, the principal issue was not whether a
defendant had waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but simply
whether his statement was voluntary. The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment
was applied. The circumstances surrounding the interrogation were examined to determine
whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession
involuntary. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936); see also Note, Police Use of Trickery as an Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. L.
REV. 1167, 1173-80 (1979) (examining pre-Miranda voluntariness standard).
58. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (af-
firming the independent viability of the pre-Miranda due process voluntariness standard).
59. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632 (1984) (holding that "the availability of
that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.").
60. Id. The Court noted that most officers when placed in Officer Kraft's position would
act out of a host of largely unverifiable motives-their own safety, the public's safety, and a
1984] 201
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Accordingly, questions "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety" need not be prefaced by a recital of Miranda warnings.61 A sub-
jective intent to elicit incriminating evidence from the suspect is not de-
terminative of the exception's applicability.6 2
The breadth of the Quarles standard appears to be a likely area for
considerable judicial debate. Frequently, the officer's inquiry can be con-
strued as one prompted by both a concern for public safety and a desire
to elicit incriminating evidence. Quarles' judicial predecessors had em-
phasized an additional prerequisite to the availability of their "public
safety" exception. The requisite concern for public safety must also be
the primary motive prompting the question. 3 The Quarles Court was si-
lent regarding such a requirement.
The use of an objective standard in determining the applicability of a
noted exception is far from an anomaly in the law.6 4 Its current injection
into fifth amendment analysis may represent a reaffirmation of Miranda's
initial attempt to objectify the law of confessions through the abandon-
desire to elicit incriminating evidence. Id.
61. Id. (holding the concealed gun in the supermarket "obviously" posed more than one
danger to public safety-an accomplice might make use of it or a customer or employee
might later come upon it).
Notwithstanding the propriety of the "public safety" exception, Justice Marshall ques-
tioned whether the objective facts before the court warranted its application. The respon-
dent was surrounded by four police officers, frisked, and handcuffed immediately upon ap-
prehension. Id. at 2630. The respondent did not have, nor was he believed to have any
accomplices. Id. at 2642. Accordingly, Justice Marshall noted that when the interrogation
began, the officers were "strictly confident of their own safety to put away their guns." Id.
Additionally, the store was virtually deserted at the time of the respondent's arrest just
after midnight. Id. at 2643. Justice Marshall noted there were no customers or employees
wandering about the store in danger of coming across the discarded gun. Id. at 2642-43.
Knowing that the respondent had discarded his weapon somewhere near the scene of the
arrest, the police could have easily cordoned off the area to facilitate a proper search for the
missing gun. Id. at 2643. Hence, Officer Kraft's question as to the whereabouts of the gun
was not "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety."
62. Id. This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant in determining the
availability of the exception. The subjective intent will probably constitute an important
factor in the objective analysis. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 308 n.7 (1980)
(recognizing the relevancy of the subjective intent of the police in the objective determina-
tion of whether "interrogation" under Miranda had occurred).
63. See, e.g., State v. Lackey, 3 Ohio App. 3d 239, 444 N.E.2d 104 (1981) (holding that
although the officer's question also elicited that evidence which formed the core element of
the crime charged, the primary concern for public safety justified the exception); cf. People
v. O'Brien, 113 Mich. App. 183, 317 N.W.2d 570 (1982) (rejecting the availability of the
"emergency exception" because it appeared the police questioning which preceded Miranda
was prompted by a dual purpose).
64. The Court has utilized an objective standard in other contexts. See, e.g., Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (whether "interrogation" under Miranda occurred); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (whether a "seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth amendment occurred); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (whether
"search incident to arrest" exception to the fourth amendment should be applied).
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ment of the previous subjective voluntariness test. 5 However, as Justice
Marshall noted, its injection also "condemns the American judiciary to a
new era of post hoc inquiry into the propriety of custodial interrogations"
not witnessed since Miranda.6
D. Future Application by the Courts
The Quarles Court acknowledged that to some degree the introduction
of the "public safety" exception lessens the desirable clarity of Miranda's
guidelines.67 While the full extent of this diminution can only be deter-
mined by further judicial discussion, it is evident that the "doctrinal
tranquility" provided under Miranda will be upset.
As Justice O'Connor noted, the "core virtue" of Miranda laid in its
rigidity and preciseness. 8 It afforded the courts clear guidance on the
manner in which custodial interrogations were to be conducted. 9 The
penalty for variations was absolute exclusion.70 Justice O'Connor pre-
dicted that the end result of the "public safety" exception will be "a
finespun new doctrine of public safety exigencies incident to custodial in-
terrogation, complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that currently
plague our [f]ourth [a]mendment jurisprudence."7' 1
Justice Marshall cited the present case as illustrative of the chaos the
"public safety" exception will unleash into the judiciary system.72 The
circumstances surrounding the respondent's arrest were never in dis-
pute.7 3 On review, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that there
was "no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circum-
stances posing a risk to the public safety. '7 4 On review, the majority of
the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion.7 5 Consistent applica-
tion of the exception is questionable "if after plenary review, two appel-
late courts so fundamentally differ over the threat to public safety
presented.'76
65. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
66. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2641-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2633 (1984).
68. Id. at 2636 (construing Fare v. Michael, 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978)).
69. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2636.
70. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
71. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2636.
72. Id. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 26, 61 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 30, 60 and accompanying text.
76. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2644. See, e.g., State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360, -, 674 P.2d 1358,
1363 (1983) (reversing a lower court decision since it believed that the officer's safety was
not sufficiently in jeopardy to allow questioning before giving the Miranda warnings); Peo-
ple v. Toler, 45 Mich. App. 156, -, 206 N.W.2d 253, 256 (1973) (noting the severity of the
defendant's injury is determinative of whether the whereabouts of the gun posed a sufficient
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While disagreements on the scope of the "public safety" exception and
mistakes in its application appear inevitable, the real victim may be the
law enforcement agencies who will have to suffer through yet another pe-
riod of constitutional uncertainty. 77
E. Future Application by the Police
The Quarles Court believed that the "public safety" exception would
alleviate the dilemma which confronted each police officer.78 The officer
previously had been placed in the untenable position of having to decide:
(1) whether to forego the Miranda warnings, ask the questions necessary
to secure the public safety, and render whatever evidence he uncovered
inadmissible; or (2) give the Miranda warnings to preserve the admissi-
bility of whatever evidence was uncovered, but jeopardize his ability to
elicit that information necessary to secure public safety.79 By removing
the applicability of Miranda's exclusionary sanction to responses elicited
by questions reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety, the
Court hoped to lessen the necessity of such on-the-scene balancing
processes.80
The Court anticipated that the exception would not be difficult for po-
lice officers to apply because "police officers can and will distinguish al-
most instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety
or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimo-
nial evidence from a suspect."' In substance, the Quarles majority im-
plicitly emphasizes the "good faith" of the officer.82 This emphasis may
inject subjectivity into the already overburdened fact-finding process.8 3
risk to public safety); State v. Vargus, 118 R.I. 113, -, 373 A.2d 150, 154 (1977) (reversing
a lower court decision since it believed the defendant was no longer a dangerous risk to
public safety). The determination of what poses a threat to public safety in a particular
setting is further complicated by factual precedent. See State v. Hayes, 73 Wash. 2d 568,
-, 439 P.2d 978, 979 (1968) (the record revealed that although the suspect's arms were
cuffed behind his back and he was escorted by a police officer, he still managed to draw a
gun from its place on his person, and point it at the officer).
77. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2645.
78. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2633 (1984).
79. Id. Justice Marshall, asserted that no dilemma actually exists. The police have never
been denied the right to ask questions prompted by a concern for public safety. All that is
denied is the use of any statements elicited before the administering of Miranda warnings
against the suspect at trial. Id. at 2636-41.
80. Id. The Burger Court has manifested its desire to lessen appellate second-guessing of
police conduct and to effect a practical and workable approach to criminal procedure. Rog-
ers, supra note 3, at 122.
81. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
82. The Court believed the exception "simply frees the police officer to follow his legiti-
mate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the public safety." Id.
83. Stone, supra note 12, at 124. The author warns that:
Use of a good faith defense . . .places a premium on ignorance. Moreover, a good
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The majority noted Officer Kraft's instinctive ability to make the dis-
tinction required under the "public safety" exception.'4 The officer only
asked for information necessary to locate the gun before advising the re-
spondent of his Miranda rights.8 5 Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opin-
ion, also cited the Miranda case, but for its exemplification of the ex-
traordinary difficulty of drawing the requisite distinction. Justice
Marshall questioned the officer's ability to draw this distinction in the
confusion and haste of the real world, if the reviewing judiciary cannot
reach a consensus as to whether a threat to the public safety existed in
the uncontested facts of Quarles.8 7
Justice O'Connor noted that in some cases, the police will benefit under
the guise of the "public safety" exception, because a reviewing court may
find that an exigency excused its failure to administer the Miranda warn-
ings.8 In other cases, the police will suffer, because though it thought an
exigency excused their noncompliance with Miranda's limitations, a re-
viewing court may view the objective circumstances differently.8 9 This is a
legitimate concern because the majority opinion could be perceived as ab-
stract and ambiguous in its guidelines. What necessarily poses a threat to
public safety and whether the exception recognizes differing degrees in
the threat to public safety are questions apparently left to the piecemeal
development of the lower courts. 90 . Accordingly, the police will have to
suffer uncertainty until a new web of clarifications is spun.9 1
faith defense would add an additional, and exceptionally difficult, fact-finding opera-
tion to the already overburdened criminal process. Except in the most unusual cir-
cumstances, determination of whether a mistake of law was "reasonable" is hardly an
easy task. The existence of such a defense could generate uncertainty and invite cal-
culated risks on the part of the police, thereby defeating the primary goal of
Miranda.
Id.
84. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2644 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2644.
88. Id. at 2636.
89. Id.
90. While questions clearly prompted by the whereabouts of the weapon, New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984), the whereabouts of a kidnapped victim, People v. Riddle, 83
Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937 (1979), and the exis-
tence of an accomplice, People v. West, 107 Cal. App. 3d 987, 165 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1980), have
now been judicially delineated as falling within the ambit of the new public safety excep-
tion, the possible existence of other exigent circumstances to which the exception will be
available is left to future extrapolations by the lower courts. On a practical level, the govern-
ment can always contend that the question was prompted by a concern for public safety.
Could not a question concerning the whereabouts of illegal drugs arguably be prompted by
an objective desire to keep them from falling into the hands of school children? See Bacigal,
supra note 11, at 263.
91. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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III. CONCLUSION
Before Miranda, the admissibility of confessions was subject to the
subtleties and elusiveness of the "totality of the circumstances" test in-
herent in the due process voluntariness standard. The Supreme Court in
seeking to rectify the misgivings of the voluntariness standard injected
the strictures of Miranda. Miranda afforded the police and the courts
clear and succinct guidance on the manner in which to conduct proper
custodial interrogations. While the preciseness of its procedural aspects
was praised, the rigidity of its sanctions was criticized. The burden it im-
posed on the realities of effective law enforcement was an administrative
cost many were not willing to endure.
The Quarles decision represents an effort not only to cut back on the
overbreadth of Miranda, but also to reconcile the realities of effective law
enforcement with the technical rules of criminal procedure. The decision
has reintroduced traditional due process review into cases where concern
for public safety predominates. The extent to which the factual scenario
found in Quarles is permitted to be extrapolated will determine whether
it remains a narrow exception or becomes the rule.
The net effect of the Quarles decision is to place more faith in the dis-
cretion and instincts of the police officer on the street. The recognition of
the "good faith" of the police in the criminal justice system appears to
mark the emergence of the Burger Court's strong conservative direction.
The extent to which this emergence will further serve to limit Miranda
must await future judicial discussion. Meanwhile, the trial courts and the
police will be left to fashion these ideals into workable and consistent
procedures.
John Randolph Bode
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